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In ﬁeld settings where the objective truth is not known, the extent to which you have the same under-
standing of the situation as your team leader may be used as an indicator for a team’s situation aware-
ness. Two experiments showed emergency response team members’ degree of shared beliefs (measured
as a ‘similarity index’) to be associated with which team they are in, but not with which position they
have in the team. This indicates that factors speciﬁc to the teams, e.g. the leader’s behavior, the team’s
shared experience, or communication patterns, are important for a team’s situation awareness. In the
second experiment, task complexity was manipulated with a scripted scenario design and heart rate vari-
ability was measured as an indicator of executive function. Shared beliefs were shown to be associated
with the degree of high frequency modulation of heart rate variability. Further, shared beliefs were
associated with the designed task complexity for some teams. The experiments showed no association
between the measure of shared beliefs and subjective reports of situation awareness.
 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Mental representations in safety team-work
Safety critical work and work in high reliability organizations is
often done in teams, where two or more operators with different
responsibilities and skill sets cooperate toward shared goals
(Salas et al., 1992). The organization of operators into teams may
be due to workload demands or due to requirements for diverse
skill sets. There may be advantages to performing safety critical
work in teams compared to doing it as individual work, as the dif-
ferent team members can monitor and assist each other to achieve
higher reliability. However, organizing the work in teams also
carries disadvantages, such as creating a more complex work
environment, losing resources to imperfect communication and
coordination, and the risk for uncoordinated team members
working toward opposing goals.
In order for team organization and team training to reduce
adverse team effects, there is a need for research on the factors that
inﬂuence a team’s efﬁciency and safe functioning. Relationships
suggested by a-priory theorizing or correlational ﬁndings (e.g. Eid
et al., 2011; Gross and Kluge, 2012; Guldenmund, 2000; Kannoet al., 2013) should be tested in experimental designs. In order to
ensure the applied value of the research, studies should strive for
both ecological validity and controlled hypothesis testing.
A fundamental assumption when studying team reliability is
that individual and aggregated task performance improves when
the teammembers have accurate mental representations of the sit-
uation. Further, a team where all the members have accurate rep-
resentations will also have similar (or shared) representations. This
should facilitate communication and cooperation, and thus
increase the team’s overall performance (Cannon-Bowers and
Salas, 2001; Mathieu et al., 2000; Sætrevik and Eid, 2014; Salas
et al., 2008; Saner et al., 2009).
A number of theoretical concepts and measurement approaches
have been suggested to describe the accuracy and cohesion of
team’s mental representations. Mental models are organized and
dynamic internal representations of past experiences (Glaser,
1989), and individual team members will have mental models
describing their tasks and the team’s work. The mental models
could to some extent be similar between individual members of
a team, indicating that they have the same knowledge or assump-
tions about the situation. Salas and colleagues (Cannon-Bowers
et al., 1993; Salas et al., 1992) have referred to this phenomenon
as a team having shared mental models (SMM). The content of the
SMMs may be task-related (e.g. relating to the equipment or job
strategies) or team-related (information about e.g. interaction pat-
terns in the team, or the skills of various team members, Mathieu
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is indicated by a team using closed-loop communication, perfor-
mance monitoring between team members, and displaying sup-
portive behavior.
The term situation awareness (SA) refers to the extent to which
an individual’s mental representation of the dynamic environment
corresponds to the actual environment. SA also refers to the pro-
cess that creates this representation in an interaction with the
environment. The prevailing model for SA divides the concept into
three hierarchical levels, which consist of perceiving, understand-
ing, and predicting the environment (Endsley, 1988a, 1995). To
account for SA in teams, the concept team SA has been introduced
to describe the aggregation of individual team members’ accurate
mental representations of their own ﬁelds of responsibility, while
shared SA has been introduced to describe the degree to which
all team members have accurate mental representations of issues
that are relevant for the whole team (Endsley, 1995). This classiﬁ-
cation emphasizes that some information in a team’s work needs
to be shared, while other information does not.
1.2. Relevance of mental representation accuracy for emergency
response team-work
To organize work into teams may have effects that are adverse
for safety, for example that the team members misunderstand
instructions, work toward opposing goals, fail to utilize all the
team’s information or resources, get involved in interpersonal con-
ﬂicts or social loaﬁng. For a high reliability organization such as the
emergency response teams (ERT) of offshore hydrocarbon energy
industry, well-coordinated team-work is critical to mission suc-
cess. The members of such teams may have other tasks and work
teams in their day-to-day jobs, but have to muster to the ERT in
case of emergencies. In some cases the emergency preparedness
approach may be organized into a ﬁrst-line (or frontline) opera-
tional ERT, a second-line tactical ERT, and a third-line strategic
ERT. While the ﬁrst-line ERT directly interacts with the event caus-
ing the emergency, the second-line ERT is tasked with collecting
and organizing all information relevant for the event, relaying
information between parties involved in the event, planning for
future development of the event, and advising the ﬁrst-line ERT.
Everyday safety (e.g. avoiding mistakes, errors and slips during
normal operation, Reason, 1990) may be determined by other fac-
tors than those important for maintaining safety while dealing
with an emergency. The task-work involved for an ERT trying to
normalize an emergency is done while team members are aware
of the high stakes involved, their physiological activation may be
increased, the teams may have limited experience in their emer-
gency tasks and with working together, and the task to be solved
may be novel. Thus an ERT’s work may be especially prone to erro-
neous actions due to inaccurate mental representations for individ-
ual teammembers or due to the teammembers having non-shared
mental models. Further, the team-work errors may be more difﬁ-
cult to notice and the consequences of team-work errors may be
larger than during normal operations.
1.3. Determinants for mental representation accuracy
One may propose three domains of determinants for the extent
to which team members have accurate representations about their
environment: the individual, the team and the task. Individual
team members vary in their level of competency and skill (see
Gross and Kluge, 2014, for an applied example), which may allow
them different baselines for learning about and understanding
their environment. Further, one may expect individual variation
in affective and motivational aspects, which may be reﬂected in
psychophysiological activation and the capacity for mentalrepresentation (Gonzalez, 2005; Gonzalez et al., 2005). To some
extent, the organization may enhance such individual factors
through personnel selection and training, and through inﬂuencing
the cultural safety values. In a research design where team or task
factors are examined (as in the one presented here), the contribu-
tion of individual factors would create noise in the analysis and
would be averaged away. On the other hand, if the mental repre-
sentations are predominantly determined by individual factors,
the analyses would not ﬁnd signiﬁcant contributions when analyz-
ing team or task factors.
In addition to team members developing mental representa-
tions through their individual information gathering and hypothe-
sis testing, there is also sharing, discussion and organization of
information between team members. This makes the team-level
a relevant domain for determinants for mental representation
accuracy. The concept of team cognition (Fiore and Salas, 2004;
Salas et al., 2007) has been used to describe multi-level interac-
tions and dependencies between intraindividual and interindivid-
ual processes. Team cognition is seen as analogous to individual
cognition, and is an emergent state where important information
is organized, represented and distributed, which allows anticipa-
tion and execution of the task (Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006).
Different traditions tend to measure team cognition either as com-
positional representation (i.e. shared SA or SMM) or as compila-
tional representations (transactive memory systems). Salas et al.
(2007) argued that SMM could be a reliable marker for team cog-
nition, which would allow the team members to make accurate
causal explanations and adapt efﬁciently to each other. Meta-anal-
yses have indicated that team cognition has strong positive rela-
tionships to behavior, motivation and performance (DeChurch
and Mesmer-Magnus, 2010; Mathieu et al., 2000, 2010). One may
expect different teams to differ in their capacity for team cognition,
which could cause differences in the accuracy of team members’
representations and hence of the team’s aggregated representa-
tions. It has been argued (DeChurch and Mesmer-Magnus, 2010)
that factors such as team leadership, shared experience and train-
ing, and workplace design may enhance team cognition. A related
concept is macrocognition in teams, which tends to emphasize col-
lective knowledge building in novel situations (Fiore et al., 2010).
This research tradition originated in naturalistic decision-making
research, and parallels distributed cognition literature. The con-
cepts of team cognition and macrocognition both correspond to
the idea that an effective team works with a high degree of coordi-
nation due to teammembers having the same understanding of the
situation and task goals.
A third domain of predictors for a team’s accurate mental repre-
sentations is aspects of the task the team is working on and how
the team members are situated in the task (Gonzalez, 2005). A task
may vary in its opaqueness, task complexity, and dynamic com-
plexity (Diehl and Sterman, 1995; Hardman, 2009). As a task grows
more complex it allows for more degrees of freedom in how the
mental representations are structured (Wood, 1986), which
increases the potential for inaccurate mental representation.
Further, given that organizing work into teams always involves a
specialization of tasks and competencies (as per the deﬁnition by
Salas et al. (1992)), a team member holding a given position in
the team will have a different access to and a different perspective
on information about the task and the team’s work than a team
member in a different position. As revealed in the discussion of
team SA and shared SA in Section 1.1, some information should be
shared by team members in all positions, while some information
can be exclusive to only some positions. If team members have dif-
ferent mental representations of the information that all positions
should share, this can lead to reduced team performance and
risk for human error. As for the information that is not shared in
the team, a team member is likely to have more accurate
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team role’s task domain. Additionally, a more generalized or super-
visory role in the team may give a superﬁcial access to many task
domains, whereas a more specialized role gives detailed access to a
single task domain.
1.4. Measurement of mental representation accuracy
Concepts such as SA and SMM are clearly important for under-
standing safe and efﬁcient teamwork (see e.g. Woods and Sarter,
2010), but the correspondence between inner states and external
reality has proven difﬁcult to measure, and different approaches
to measuring the accuracy of mental representations have been
suggested. Some measures are subjective (e.g. Taylor, 1990), in that
they ask the operators to evaluate the accuracy of their mental rep-
resentations. Other measures are objective (e.g. Endsley, 1988b), in
that they rely on comparing what the operators believe to be true
about the situation with the experimenter’s knowledge about the
reality. In some cases process measures (see e.g. Patrick and
Morgan, 2010) may be used to assess the operator’s cognitive pro-
cesses based on her or his actions, e.g. by examining communica-
tion, eye-movements or interaction with a control system.
Finally, one may use observers to rate the accuracy of operator’s
beliefs based on their observable actions (e.g. Matthews et al.,
2000). See other publications (e.g. Hone et al., 2006; Sætrevik
and Eid, 2014; Salmon et al., 2006; Saner et al., 2009) for more
detailed reviews of different measurement techniques and their
limitations. The preferred approach to measure mental representa-
tion accuracy may partly depend on the research setting affor-
dances, and partly on the researcher’s theoretical understanding
of SA. Salmon et al. (2006) recommended that studies of SA should
combine a variety of measures.
In applied settings where no standard for objective truth is
available or can feasibly be measured, it may be challenging to
measure the cohesion of a team’s knowledge states (i.e. shared
SA or SMM). Thus, while mental representation accuracy is likely
to predict safe team performance, a precise measurement of it is
impossible in all but the most artiﬁcial settings. I have previously
argued (Sætrevik and Eid, 2014) that in applied settings it may
be meaningful to measure the individual team members’ beliefs
about the situation, and use the extent to which they share the
same beliefs to calculate a similarity index. This builds on the
assumption that although individual beliefs will depart from the
objective truth, an ‘‘average’’ of the measurements may be closer
to the truth. An approach of this type has also been suggested by
Saner et al. (2009).
If the setting allows one to assume that one of the team mem-
bers, e.g. the team leader, should on average be better informed
than the rest of the team, one may compare the answers from
the rest of the team to the answers of this member, and assume
that a higher degree of agreement represents more accurate
knowledge. If the team leader is indeed more accurate than other
team members, the similarity between a team member’s beliefs
and the team leader’s beliefs may approach a measure of SA,
despite not directly measuring whether the beliefs correspond to
an objective reality. Thus the similarity of a team member’s beliefs
to her or his team leader’s beliefs will be used as a proxy for having
accurate beliefs about the work and the team, which should
correspond to high levels of SA. I will refer to this approach as mea-
suring the degree of shared beliefs of a team or of a team member.
In the terms of DeChurch and Mesmer-Magnus (2010), this is a
measure of compositional emergence. A more detailed description
of the similarity index approach, inherent assumptions and caveats
can be found in a previous publication (Sætrevik and Eid, 2014).
To function in a complex environment, an organism must bal-
ance between and modulate control from the sympathetic nervoussystem, involved in ﬂight-or-ﬁght responses, and the parasympa-
thetic nervous system, involved in rest and restitution (Thayer
et al., 2012). It is assumed that an alert and well-adapted organism
continually adjusts its bodily activation to suit the current environ-
ment demands, whereas an organism that is under high levels of
emotional stress to less degree does these moment-to-moment
calibrations and its behavior is more regulated by automatic and
prepotent processes. The degree of high frequency modulation of
heart rate may reﬂect the organism’s modulation of cognitive sys-
tems to adapt to the environment. It has been argued (Luft et al.,
2009; Thayer et al., 2009) that the central autonomic network links
the activation in prefrontal cortex neural function to heart rate
variation (HRV). Thus the degree of high-frequency modulation
of HRV can be used as an indicator of executive function. It has
been showed that indices of HRV positively correlates with perfor-
mance on working memory and executive function tasks (Elliot
et al., 2011; Hansen et al., 2003) and with ﬁeld measures of SA
(McKneely et al., 2006; Saus et al., 2012).1.5. Current study
In the current research project, I wanted to measure the similar-
ity index of ERT members in an ecological setting in order to iden-
tify some of the factors that lead to shared mental representations
which improves the organization’s safety. A further research inter-
est was to assess the validity of subjective estimates of SA in the
current setting. A ﬁnal research interest was to assess whether
the measurements reﬂect changes in cognitive states induced by
changes in the team’s task. To move beyond self-report and simi-
larity measures of mental representation and toward a more direct
measure of internal states, HRV was used as a psychophysiological
measure of executive function (Hansen et al., 2003). This allows for
testing of whether the task manipulation, similarity index and sub-
jective reports reﬂect changes in internal states.
We performed two ﬁeld experiments among the six ERTs of a
hydrocarbon energy company, as described in Section 1.1. For
more details on the setting for the data collection, please see a pre-
vious publication (Sætrevik and Eid, 2014). Each of the six teams
had around ten members. Both experiments had the same
measures of shared beliefs and of subjective SA. Experiment 2
had a higher degree of experimental control, more frequent mea-
surements, manipulated the task complexity, and recorded psy-
chophysiological activation (HRV).1.6. Hypotheses
Based on the possible determinants of mental representations
in teams discussed in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, the current study will
test the following hypotheses: Given that team factors may cause
members of some teams to have more accurate mental representa-
tions than members of other teams, the similarity index will vary
between teams (H1). Further, if the team builds their understand-
ing of the situation over the time they collaborate on a task, the
similarity index will increase over scenario time (H2). Given that
a complex task offers more degrees of freedom for how a mental
representation can be structured, shared beliefs will decrease with
task complexity, yielding lower similarity index (H3). Recent
research has shown task induced psychophysiological activation
to be associated with decreased executive function. Thus shared
beliefs (as indexed by similarity index) will decrease when cogni-
tive resources (as indexed by HRV) decreases (H4). Finally, given
that SA is often measured with subjective assessment, one may
expect the subjective SA measure to predict the level of similarity
index (H5). Descriptive statistics for both experiments are pro-
vided elsewhere (Sætrevik and Eid, 2014).
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2.1. Experiment 1 methods
2.1.1. Experiment 1 sample
The participants in both experiments were second-line ERTs
that are tasked with gathering and organizing information about
a dynamically evolving external event, such as a ﬁre on an offshore
oil rig. Team members largely work individually, collecting infor-
mation from external human, document and instrument sources,
and their work is organized by a team leader. All the six ERTs in
the organization participated in the data collection. There were
one team leader and between 9 and 11 team members on each
team, yielding a total of 58 participants.2.1.2. Experiment 1 procedure
Data collection for Experiment 1 was done during the ERT’s reg-
ular training exercises. The training exercises are run as realisti-
cally as possible, with the ERT located in the emergency rooms,
using the actual equipment, and interacting with the onshore
and offshore personnel that would be involved in the handling of
an actual incident of this type at this time. Experiment 1 placed
no restrictions on the scenario design, which lasted between 2
and 3 h.
During scenario play, at the time when the team leader
announced a status meeting, team members were told to answer
eight probe questions in a pen-and-paper booklet. The ﬁrst ﬁve
probe questions queried for information about the task and the
team’s work, asking about the incident location, incident type, sta-
tus of personnel, and asked team members to predict the outcome
of the incident and to state the current priorities in the team’s
work. The similarity index was computed for each probe question
by calculating the numerical distance between the team member’s
answer and the team leader’s answer, and standardizing it to vary
from 0 to 1. Similarity index scores approaching 1 on probe ques-
tions indicated that a team member had given the same answer as
the team leader, while lower similarity scores indicated more dif-
ference between the team member’s and the team leader’s
answers. For more details on the method of calculation, please
see a previous publication (Sætrevik and Eid, 2014). The ﬁnal three
probe questions were inspired by the 3D-SART measure (Taylor,
1990), and asked about the team member’s subjective evaluation
of their SA in terms of their access to the information they needed,
the demand on their attention and the completeness of their
understanding for their area of responsibility.2.1.3. Experiment 1 analyses
The analyses will use team members’ average scores of similar-
ity index (across probes 1–5) to measure shared belief, and average
subjective SA scores (across probes 6–8). For a discussion of score
distribution across probes 1–5, see a previous publication
(Sætrevik and Eid, 2014). The ERTs had between 4 and 6 status
meetings during the scenario. In order to compare the teams, only
the ﬁrst four data points from each team were used in the analysis.
Two repeated measures general linear model (GLM) analyses,
using the least square methods, were performed to test the effects
on shared beliefs and on subjective SA separately. The ﬁrst GLM
had team membership and team position as categorical predictors,
subjective SA score as continuous predictor, and four repeated
measures of shared beliefs as outcome variable. If a participant
missed less than half of the shared belief measurements, the miss-
ing values were replaced with the participant’s average of the
remaining scores (24 of 184 data points imputed). A second GLM
had team membership and team position as categorical predictors,
scenario average shared beliefs as continuous predictor, and fourrepeated measures of subjective SA as outcome variable. If a partic-
ipant missed less than half of the four subjective SA measurements,
the missing scores were replaced with the participant’s average of
the remaining scores (30 of 208 data points were imputed).
Applying Bonferroni correction for three predictors yields an alpha
level of p = .0167 (0.05/3) for both GLMs. All analyses were done
using statistical package STATISTICA 12 (StatSoft Inc., Tulsa, OK,
USA).
2.2. Experiment 1 results and discussion
The ﬁrst GLM showed a signiﬁcant effect of team membership
(F(5,38) = 3.67, p = .008) showing that shared belief was predicted
by team membership, in the sense that the members of some
teams scored higher for shared belief than the members of other
teams. There was no effect of team position (F(7,38) = .81,
p = .59), of subjective SA (F(1,38) = 1.27, p = .27), or of measure-
ment time (F(3,114) = .65, p = .58). None of the interactions were
signiﬁcant. The interaction closest to signiﬁcance was between
team membership and time of measurement (F(15,114) = 1.56,
p = .1), indicating that different teams may have had different tra-
jectories across the scenario, but there was no clear trend of teams
increasing or decreasing their shared belief over time.
The second GLM showed no signiﬁcant main effects of team
membership F(5,38) = .34, p = .88), of role (F(7,38) = 1.99, p = .08),
of shared beliefs (F(1,38) = 0.46, p = .5) or of measurement time
(F(3,114) = 1.19, p = .32). Thus the participants’ subjective rating
of their SA was not predicted by which team they belonged to,
which position they had in the team, or the degree to which they
had the same beliefs as their team leader. There was a non-signif-
icant trend of increased SA conﬁdence across the four measure-
ment points (mean = 5.07, SD = 0.17, mean = 5.55, SD = 0.12,
mean = 5.7, SD = 0.12, mean = 5.73, SD = 0.12). There was a
signiﬁcant interaction effect between time of measurement and
team membership (F(15,114) = 2.43, p = .004), indicating that dif-
ferent teams rated their SA differently at different time points.
When examining the means, three of the teams showed a
trend of increasing their estimates as the scenario progressed
while the other three teams did not have a clear trend. The inter-
action between time of measurement and team position
(F(21,114) = 1.75, p = .04), which would indicate that SA conﬁ-
dence changed over time for some team positions, did not satisfy
the Bonferroni corrected alpha level.3. Experiment 2
3.1. Experiment 2 methods
3.1.1. Experiment 2 sample
The data collection of Experiment 2 aimed for a higher degree of
experimental control, fewer missing values, psychophysiological
measurement and experimental manipulation of task complexity
in order to draw causal inferences. The same participants took part
in Experiment 2 as in Experiment 1, but organized into different
teams. As not all of the ERT personnel in the organization were able
to participate this time, only ﬁve teams took part, with one team
leader and eight team members in each team (for a total of 45 par-
ticipants in Experiment 2).
3.1.2. Experiment 2 procedure
A detailed scenario was scripted, and was executed using a staff
of actors playing the roles of the ERT’s counterparts in all scenario
communications. Further, in order to get better temporal resolu-
tion and to disentangle the measured variables from the team lea-
der’s decision to arrange status meetings, eight measurement
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and 160 min after scenario start (participants were not informed
about the measurement schedule). To facilitate data-processing,
electronic questionnaires on the teammember’s work station were
used, while the probe content was mostly similar to Experiment 1
(for details, see Sætrevik and Eid, 2014). In order to separate the
effect of time passed from other factors that could have an effect
on the variation in task performance, the scripted scenario was
designed to have an ABAB variation of complexity. In this design,
the task was more complex in the ﬁrst and third quarter of the sce-
nario run, and more straight-forward in the second and fourth
quarter of the scenario run. Complexity was manipulated accord-
ing to the descriptions of Campbell (1988) and Wood (1986).
In order to have an accessible indicator of psychophysiological
activation, all participants in Experiment 2were outﬁtted with con-
sumer grade heart rate measurement equipment (Polar RSX800CX,
consisting of a chest sensor band and a wrist receiver unit). The
time of onset for each heartbeat (R-wave to R-wave, RR) was mea-
sured continuously throughout the scenario. To avoid overestimat-
ing the impact of sympathetic inﬂuence due to non-stationarity in
the recording (Jorna, 1992; Magagnin et al., 2011), eight segments
containing the 5 min preceding each questionnaire measurement
were extracted for analysis. From these values, the root mean
sum of squared distances (rMSSD; Berntson et al., 2005) of RR inter-
vals in heart rate were calculated to get a single value indicator that
relates to high-frequency in modulating the heart rate.
3.1.3. Experiment 2 analyses
Three repeated measures GLMs were performed to test the
effects on shared beliefs, on subjective SA, and on HRV separately.
The ﬁrst GLM had team membership, team position and task com-
plexity as categorical predictors, scenario average subjective SA
score and scenario average HRV as continuous predictors, and eight
repeated measures of shared beliefs as outcome variable. If a par-
ticipant missed less than half of the eight shared belief scores the
missing scores were replaced with the participant’s average of
the remaining scores (25 of 320 data points were imputed). The
second GLM had team membership, team position and task com-
plexity as categorical predictors, scenario average shared beliefs
and scenario average HRV as continuous predictors, and eight
repeated measures of subjective SA as outcome variable. If a partic-
ipant missed less than half of the eight subjective SA scores, the
missing values were replaced with the average of the participant’s
remaining scores (36 of 360 data points were imputed). The third
GLM had team membership, team position and task complexity
as categorical predictors, scenario average shared beliefs and sub-
jective SA as continuous predictors, and eight repeated measures of
HRV as outcome variable. If a participant missed less than half of
the HRV measurements (due to signal loss), the missing values
were replaced with the average of the participant’s remaining
measurements (4 of 320 data points were imputed). Applying
Bonferroni correction for ﬁve predictors yields an alpha level of
p = .01 (0.05/5) for all three GLMs.
3.2. Experiment 2 results and discussion
The ﬁrst GLM showed a main effect of team membership
(F(4,19) = 13.33, p < .001), indicating that members of some teams
had higher degree of shared beliefs than members of other teams.
There was also a main effect of HRV (F(1,19) = 9.4, p < .001), indi-
cating that having more executive function resources available
(as indexed by rMSSD of HRV) was associated with higher degree
of shared beliefs. There was no main effect of team position
(F(4,19) = 2.14, p = .09) or of task complexity (F(1,19) = 2.64,
p = .12). There was a signiﬁcant interaction effect between team
membership and task complexity (F(4,19) = 6.29, p = .002),indicating that some teams had less shared belief in the parts of
the scenario with higher complexity. There was also a signiﬁcant
interaction between team membership, task complexity and mea-
surement time (F(12,57) = 3.72, p < .001), indicating that different
teams had different shared belief trajectories over time relative
to task complexity conditions.
The second GLM had no signiﬁcant main effects. There was a
signiﬁcant interaction between team membership and task com-
plexity (F(4,19) = 5.5, p = .004), indicating that some teams
expressed more conﬁdence in the lower complexity condition,
while others did not. The interaction between team membership
and measurement time (F(12,57) = 2.26, p = .02), indicating that
some teams increased their conﬁdence over time, while others
did not, did not satisfy the Bonferroni corrected alpha level.
Inspecting the means showed that four teams increased their SA
conﬁdence through the experiment, while the ﬁnal team had lower
conﬁdence on the last measurements than on the ﬁrst. There was a
signiﬁcant interaction between teammembership, task complexity
and measurement time (F(12,57) = 3.02, p < .003), indicating that
some teams increased their conﬁdence across scenario time rela-
tive to the task complexity, while other teams did not.
The third GLM showed a main effect of average shared belief
(F(1,19) = 5.69, p = .003), indicating that the team members who
showed more psychophysiological adaptability to the environment
(indicating executive function resources) were also the partici-
pants with higher degree of shared beliefs. There were no main
or interaction effects of team membership, team position, subjec-
tive SA or time of measurement.
4. General discussion
4.1. Summary of results
In the present two experiments, team members’ shared beliefs
(i.e. their similarity index score) varied more between teams than
within teams. This indicates that some aspect of the teammember-
ship accounted for the degree towhich teammembers had the same
understanding of the situation as their team leader. There was also
an interaction in Experiment 2 indicating that task complexity
accounted for the variation in shared beliefs for some of the teams.
However, shared beliefs did not vary consistently over time, indi-
cating that the participants did not consistently come closer to their
team leader’s understanding of the situation as the scenario pro-
gressed. Despite this, there was a trend for increasing subjective
evaluation of SA, indicating that some teams became more conﬁ-
dent over time. Importantly, in neither experiment was subjective
evaluation of SA associated with the degree of shared beliefs.
Further, Experiment 2 measured psychophysiological activation
in terms of HRV. A greater degree of modulation of activation was
taken as an indicator for the team member’s executive function in
adapting to a changing task environment. Results showed HRV to
be associated with scenario average similarity index, indicating
that team members with higher degrees of shared beliefs showed
more adaptability to the environment. Conversely, the team mem-
bers’ average subjective SA did not account for the variation in
HRV. The HRV did not vary consistently over the time course of
the scenario, and did not vary according to the designed task
complexity.
Some of the hypotheses presented in Section 1.6 were sup-
ported while others were not. H1 was supported, as teammember-
ship predicted shared beliefs. H2, that shared beliefs would
increase over scenario time was not clearly supported, although
there was a trend for an interaction with team membership in
Experiment 1, and an interaction with team membership and com-
plexity in Experiment 2. H3 was partly supported, as Experiment 2
showed that shared beliefs decreased with task complexity for
122 B. Sætrevik / Safety Science 78 (2015) 117–123some teams. H4 was supported, as shared beliefs decreased when
psychophysiological indicator for executive function (HRV)
decreased. Finally, there was no support for H5, as subjective
assessment of SA was not associated with the degree of shared
beliefs.
4.2. Mechanisms for developing shared beliefs
Both experiments indicated that team membership predicts
more accurate mental representations (in terms of sharing the
beliefs of your team leader). However, the experiments are not sui-
ted to inform us about what it is about some teams that gave them
more accurate mental representations. As discussed in Section 1.2,
it is appropriate to assume that the patterns in compilational men-
tal representations may be due to differences in team cognition or
macrocognition between the teams. It has been argued (DeChurch
and Mesmer-Magnus, 2010; Fiore et al., 2010; Salas et al., 2008,
2007) that in order to be useful, such concepts should be tied to
behavior markers and to the mechanisms that causes behavior to
lead to enhanced team coordination and team effectiveness.
One possible mechanism is that acts of leadership has a direct
effect on the accuracy of the mental representation of the team
members. In the current setting, the team leader is tasked with
organizing the team’s work, collecting and sharing information
and setting team priorities. The team leader does this mostly
through one-on-one communication directly to individual team
members, and through brief plenary status meetings arranged at
the leader’s discretion about every half hour. Previous analyses of
this data set (Sætrevik and Eid, 2014) showed that the frequency
of status meetings or the time passed since previous meeting did
not predict the degree of shared beliefs. Thus, if the leader’s com-
munication is critical, it must be more subtle variations in the com-
munication that determines team performance. In further studies,
it could be examined whether the team differences in shared
beliefs are due to the quality or the content of the leader’s commu-
nication by analyzing the content of one-on-one conversations or
status meetings. It could also be of interest to examine the pattern
of communication and relationships within the teams, to see if
teams with high degrees of shared beliefs have different communi-
cation structures or social structures than teams that do not func-
tion as well. In order to answer questions on this level of analysis, a
more detailed data collection will be needed where minute actions
and information ﬂow are studied. An example of this would be the
TeamPrints approach (Bolstad et al., 2007).
It could be the team leader’s overall leadership style that inﬂu-
ences the team’s performance, for example by enhancing the team
members’ motivation or the intra-team relationships (i.e. authentic
leadership, Avolio and Gardner, 2005, or transformational leader-
ship; Eid et al., 2004). Alternatively, the team leader’s actions
may directly inﬂuence the team’s information ﬂow, through mon-
itoring and directing team members’ work and attention to where
it is needed. Such hypotheses could be tested by examining the
effect on shared beliefs of replacing the team’s leader, using a sim-
ilar design as used by Espevik et al. (2006).
4.3. Implications
The current study found mental representations’ accuracy
(measured as similarity to team leader’s beliefs) to be stable across
different team roles, but to vary between teams. This indicates that
factors speciﬁc to the teams determine the team members’ ability
to orient themselves in the situation. This appears to justify further
work on identifying such factors and on improving them in train-
ing programs. Manipulating the task scenario showed that for
some teams the mental representations’ accuracy suffered when
task complexity increased. It could be that team members can betrained to counter the effects of information complexity, for exam-
ple by learning to structure the way information is communicated,
and case-based training programs could help team members to
quickly identify typical situations and structure incoming informa-
tion around appropriate cognitive schemas.
The current study successfully applied a novel ﬁeld measure
(see Sætrevik and Eid, 2014, for details) for testing hypotheses
about a team’s mental representation accuracy, which indicates
that the approach may also be applied in future studies. Further,
the similarity index as a measure of shared beliefs in a team was
a more useful approach to measure the accuracy of a team mem-
ber’s mental representations than self-reported SA was. This may
support Endsley’s claim (Endsley, 1994) that the utility of subjec-
tive SA measurements is limited, as they are an indicator of the
responder’s conﬁdence, rather than indicating the accuracy of their
beliefs about the situation. The study thus indicates that it is not
advisable to use subjective evaluation of SA as an indicator for
the accuracy of mental representations. The measurement
approach may be of interest for researchers examining the factors
contributing to the development and maintenance of SMM or SA.
The approach may also be implemented by industry trainers that
seek to identify team members, team positions or task aspects
where SA declines and additional resources are needed. When
studying several teams in the same setting, the approach can be
used to identify differences between teams (e.g. different commu-
nication patterns) that cause variation in SA.
The current study found that team members’ physiological acti-
vation was associated with their degree of shared beliefs. To my
knowledge, HRV has not previously been associated with SA for
ERTs. As heart rate measurement is relatively manageable in ﬁeld
settings, it may be a fruitful as an objective measure of executive
function among team members in future ﬁeld studies of team per-
formance and for training. Task complexity was seen to interact
with team membership in modulating HRV, and to be associated
with the degree of shared beliefs. It thus appears appropriate that
teams should be aware of the impact of psychophysiological acti-
vation on team performance.
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